There are two reasons why developed nations pursue nuclear technology: to build power plants, and to build weapons. While Iran is clearly hoping to rely on nuclear power to re-enforce the country’s energy security, most experts seem to assume that the desire to possess a nuclear bomb also factors into Tehran’s decision to continue enriching uranium in the face of mounting international pressure to suspend. However, as Fareed Zakaria ably demonstrates in his latest Newsweek column, this assumption is not really grounded in fact, but constructed primarily from the record and rhetoric of Persian leaders, notably the outrageous Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The case against this assumption is convincing. First, the facts. Time and again, IAEA inspectors have determined that, although the Iranians have repeatedly failed to meet their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there was no evidence to suggest that uranium enrichment at the Natanz facility was indicative of a weapons program. The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which represents the consensus view of all United States intelligence agencies, claims Iran did have a weapons program, but is inactive as of 2003 (the accuracy of this report has been questioned by the IAEA).

Second, the rhetoric. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly denounced nuclear weapons as un-Islamic. In 2004, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa declaring the use of nuclear weapons was forbidden under Islam. Just this week, Iran issued a statement condemning North Korea’s second nuclear weapons test, and called for “global de-nuclearization”.

Of course, there’s no reason to believe the Iranian leadership. But, as Zakaria notes, they could try to fool the internationally community without invoking Islam and issuing Fatwas; doing so puts them in a bind that a nation pursuing elicit weaponry would logically try to avoid.

This evidence, while far from conclusive, does mean a couple of things. It means the Iranians have an exit strategy; that they could conceivably suspend enrichment without loosing face domestically or internationally. It also means the Obama administration has an opening to try and push Iran down this path. This is, however, dependent on one condition: the West would have to accept that Iran is not going to be coaxed into dropping their energy program. Iranians citizens are overwhelmingly in favor of nuclear energy; the plant at Bushehr – due to go online this year – is a source of national pride. Put simply, the nuclear program is, in the eyes of the Iranian leadership, too big to fail.

This doesn’t mean we don’t have options. Given past Iranian statements on the matter, it should be possible to bring the country back into NPT and IAEA compliance; given the right pressure it may even be possible to secure some other concessions to prevent the Iranians from weaponizing once the reactors are complete (this is probably the least anyone will want to settle for). Initially, it may not be enough to satisfy regional interests like the Israelis and the Saudis, but could end up as a workable solution in the long run. And with Iran, maybe that’s the best we can hope for.

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